

25X1

Approved For Release 2009/08/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200680028-9

MEMORANDUM FOR:

O/DCI
Executive Registry
7 E 12
Headquarters

Amel

Attached is a draft agenda and reports for the
ORPA Small Group meeting with the DCI.

Date

Approved For Release 2009/08/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200680028-9

SECRET SENSITIVE

AGENDA FOR ORPA MEETING WITH DCI

I. ACCESS TO SENSITIVE POLICY-RELATED INFORMATION

PROBLEM

ORPA's continued lack of access to the full record of high level US negotiations with various foreign governments and the reluctance of top US officials to share with us their personal knowledge and observations about their negotiating partners' bargaining style, personal interrelationships, knowledgability, etc., continue to handicap our efforts to provide top quality analytical support to US policy makers.

The problem is shared in varying degrees by all of our geographical components. In general, the more sensitive, the more high-level, the more important these discussions are, the less we know or can find out about them.

This problem is particularly acute for analysts concerned with the USSR and China. The analysts charged with providing objective assessments--upon which major policy decisions are at least in part supposedly based--must turn largely to the open media and to reports from foreign sources in trying to piece together details about our own government's high level dealings with Moscow and Peking. Pending resolution of this problem, other steps to improve the quality of our analysis in these two areas will only constitute half-way measures.

The recent experience of ORPA's China Branch in response to President Carter's [recent] request for an assessment of what Peking expected from Dr. Brzezinski's then upcoming trip to China dramatized the difficulties under which we labor. As the request was conveyed to the ranks, President Carter wanted to use the assessment in giving instructions to Dr. Brzezinski. Although China Branch was able to provide some general observations on China's current attitudes and policies toward the US, it felt compelled to state frankly in the assessment that the talks with Dr. Brezezinski were part of an ongoing dialogue about which we know very little. Moreover, had we known what specific points Dr. Brzezinski would raise with the Chinese we might have been able to respond more precisely regarding Chinese attitudes.

While China Branch has developed rather good rapport with the NSC staffer--Michel Oksenberg--who accompanied Dr. Brzezinski to Peking, he is obviously under instructions to restrict his discussions with us about top

level Sino-US exchanges to vague generalities: in the one debriefing session we have had with him since his return he declined to provide us even with the type of details that have appeared in the press about the recent talks in Peking. In response to a request from Dr. Bowie some time ago, Mr. Oksenberg explained that the matter of CIA access to the record of US-China dealings at this level--under both present and past administrations--was a matter that should be taken up by "our principals."

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Access to existing information should be improved.
 - A. We believe that access to NODIS is still not as good as it should be. NODIS-Cherokee traffic does not come to CIA and regular NODIS traffic must often be specifically requested.
 - B. MEMCONS and transcripts about important meetings are not available to CIA analysts either on a reasonably current basis or even some years back.
2. New channels of information feedback should be developed. Briefings by lower level staff officials who travel with or take part in some of the discussions could be set up. Recently, for example, Leslie Gelb, head of Political-Military Affairs at State, gave a rare personal briefing on his recent Conventional Arms Transfer Negotiations with the Soviets in Helsinki. Our analysts found this meeting extremely helpful.
3. Analysts assigned to produce assessments requested by policy makers should be made privy to the information necessary to perform this task effectively. Such access need not mean that the information be widely disseminated or that the floodgates be opened. It would require, however, extensive access to information on a selected basis. Recently for example, we were asked to assess the Soviet reaction to our concern over the COSMOS affair. In another unusual departure from the norm, individual CIA analysts were given access to relevant diplomatic traffic and held discussions with the staff of US principals who discussed this with the Soviets. The paper was subsequently praised by Dr. Brzezinski.

REQUESTED DCI ACTIONS

1. Take up with your counterparts at State, NSC, and Defense the question of CIA access to the information noted above by at least a few selected working level analysts.

2. If new presentations at this level prove unproductive, you might consider obtaining a ruling from President Carter during one of your weekly sessions with him or at some meeting attended by him and all the relevant principals. The recent Sino-Soviet memorandum mentioned above could serve as an example which would presumably still be fresh in the memories of all concerned.

II. THE DCI BRIEFING PROCESS

PROBLEM

The process of selecting and producing presidential briefings seems cumbersome and inefficient. The selection process results in the production of more briefings than can reasonably be presented; some 20 were in various stages of preparation as of May 31, for example. The long lead time between selection and presentation (3 to 4 weeks and more), along with frequent postponements, often necessitate major revisions and additions. Moreover, there is little feedback to the production offices and analysts once the briefings are presented.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Reduce the number of briefings actually produced.
2. Eliminate requirement for preliminary outline.
3. Shorten the lead time between selection and presentation.
4. If possible, provide more feedback about the President's reactions and substantive comments on the briefings.

III. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE VS. RESEARCH

One of the oldest unresolved problems in the production of political intelligence is that of accommodating the consumers' need for quick and comprehensive assessments of current developments, and their equally compelling need for more contemplative analyses of major trends (variously described as estimates, assessments, research papers, or appraisals). We have no specific solutions to recommend but we raise the subject because we perceive conflicting signals from senior Agency management on where the emphasis should be placed.

In organizing itself to meet these dual responsibilities, the DDI and NFAC have tried a number of combinations over the years, including:

- Separate offices of national Estimates and Current Intelligence (plus a small Special Research Staff focusing on the USSR and China);
- Separate offices of Current Intelligence and Political Research;
- A single political office (ORPA) and a Current Reporting Group with its own complement of analysts;
- The present arrangement (ORPA analysts providing current intelligence for publications managed by the CRG as well as research projects).

The separate-offices approach usually has suffered from jurisdictional problems over the many projects that fall somewhere between the quick-response item and the national estimate. Sometimes this has meant wasteful duplication; at other times it has left gaps in the services we provided.

The single-office approach--even with a cadre of analysts attached to CRG--has been faulted because it does not really end the competition for analysts' time between current intelligence and the felt need for more penetrating analysis. This is the complaint heard most frequently today. Its corollary is the notion that we could free more analytical time by treating our daily current intelligence responsibility as essentially a gisting operation (like the State Department Morning Summary), and that this might be done by a small, separate group of officers, perhaps in the CIA Operations Center.

ORPA analysts do not believe this approach would work, nor that it would appreciably reduce the time they spend on current intelligence.

- Most analysts believe that in any system they must stay on top of current developments, if only to keep their work relevant to the needs of the policymaker. Even analysts involved in research projects requiring their full time and attention profit from exchanges with colleagues doing current work.
- The quality and timeliness of political items in the PDB depend on the ability of analysts to stay current. Cable gists will not suffice.
- The experiment with a CRG analytic component showed that quality current intelligence cannot be divorced from analysis, and that the needs of the policymaker cannot be met without an ORPA input.
- Eliminating this analytical input would result in an increase in urgent requests from consumers for substantive assessments and clarification of the gisted material carried in the daily summary. This could prove more time-consuming than the present system.

Opinion varies in ORPA on the best way to present current intelligence-- whether to retain the present newspaper layout or to return to a booklet format. A related question is how comprehensive we should try to be on subjects treated extensively in the press. But these differences are of relatively little moment. The important thing is that ORPA analysts must (and inevitably will) remain intimately involved in whatever current intelligence the Agency produces. Moreover, the belief that ORPA can determine the balance between current intelligence and research is not always true. Often, the press of world events rather than office preference forces the balance in favor of current intelligence production. ✓

ORPA analysts also feel a commitment to producing the best middle- and long-term analysis in town, and believe their record on that score is better than critics acknowledge. The need to produce quick-response intelligence unquestionably disrupts this process, although the extent of the disruption at any given time varies greatly among geographic divisions. Some analysts believe that the previous dual-office structure was more conducive to high-quality middle- and long-term research and analysis,

and virtually all analysts agree that the working environment available in ORPA is badly suited to thoughtful research.

On balance, however, ORPA analysts would caution against another painful reorganization--either structural or functional. They would prefer to try to make the present system work better. Their ability to do so depends in large measure on clear guidelines both from consumers and from senior Agency management.

SUPPLEMENTAL LIST

I. MID-CAREER COURSE

PROBLEM

The Agency's Mid-Career course curriculum offers little in the way of managerial theory other than that which can be absorbed by listening to office chiefs describe their organizations. Nor does the course require the attendee to do significant outside reading to supplement the information provided by the individuals addressing the course.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Since most of the attendees of the course are managers or hope to be in the future, we believe the course's curriculum should be updated. It should present additional material on managerial theory and practices to provide the attendee with a better understanding of organizational structure and dynamics. It should require that the attendee do extensive outside reading on the topics discussed by the speakers.

Future courses should include speakers addressing topics that are designed to achieve the following goals:

1. Sharpen the manager's self-awareness, including: abilities, values, strengths, and needs;
2. Improve the manager's skills of interaction in the work situation, especially with regard to such management functions as motivation, coordination, delegation, and leadership styles;
3. Enhance the manager's abilities to anticipate change and provide up-to-date knowledge in developing strategies of making and adapting to change;
4. Increase the manager's skills in conflict resolution, planning, and decision making;
5. Increase the manager's understanding of the major trends and issues of our time--the ecological crises, the changing role of government, the women's liberation movement--as they impact on middle management.

The addition of the above topics to the Mid-Career course would significantly increase the benefits received by both the attendee and the Agency from the time and funds invested.

II. SPECIAL HIRING POLICIES

PROBLEM

When an individual applies for employment with the Agency, an orange applicant personnel folder is created for processing purposes. A pink routing/comments sheet is placed inside the left side of the folder so that comments by Personnel Officers and interviewers can be noted.

However, when an applicant is referred to the Agency by a Senator, Congressman, or other high government official, the applicant's papers are placed in a green folder marked "Priority Handling" rather than the standard orange folder. In addition, a special blue sheet is placed on the inside right side of the folder. This blue sheet is marked "Special Interest" and indicates the name of the high government official who referred the applicant to the Agency. Furthermore, when an applicant is referred through the DCI's office, a special "Immediate" sticker is attached to the green folder.

This dual process for handling applications to the Agency appears on the surface to allow for preferential treatment. Whether this is actually the case or not is not the issue. The opportunity for special treatment is present. In fact, over a period of time, the practice of special treatment of applicants whose papers are in green folders is a very strong possibility.

RECOMMENDATION

All applications for employment should be processed using the standard orange folder. Furthermore, the use of the blue Special Interest sheets and Immediate stickers should be discontinued. Any comments about persons referring applicants to the Agency can be placed on the standard pink routing/comment sheet or on a separate piece of paper just as any letter of recommendation would be included in any other applicant's folder.